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On the Non-Symmetric
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Abstract. Recently, in some negotiation application areas, the usual assumption that negotia-
tors are symmetric has been relaxed. In particular, weights have been introduced to the Nash
Bargaining Solution to reflect the different powers of the players. Yet, we feel that operating
with non-symmetric bargaining solutions and their implications is not well understood. We
analyze the properties and optimization of the non-symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution and
of a non-symmetric Kalai–Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution. We provide extensive compara-
tive statics, then comment on the implications of the concepts in supply chain coordination
contexts.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The original Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) is symmetric in the excesses of the
players’ utilities over their disagreement utilities. Thus, bargainers are envisioned to
be on “equal footing.” In an attempt to give one player a “priority” over the other(s),
Kalai (1977) axiomatized and presented the non-symmetric NBS (NSNBS). It uses
different powers of the excesses over the disagreement values, summing to one. While
Kalai (1977) and others explored the axiomatics of the NSNBS, its optimization and
economic implications have not been fully explored. As the NSNBS is being recently
used in various supply chain settings (Nagarajan and Sosic, 2008; Wu et al., 2009;
Mantin et al., 2014), it is important that the SCM and other communities that use such
bargaining models will know their general properties. We also consider a lesser-known,
non-symmetric version of the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution, where the excesses of the
ideal point over the disagreement point are taken to differing powers (Durba, 2001).
We then discuss the uses of these concepts in Supply Chain settings.
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2. NBS ANALYSIS
The non-symmetric, two-player NBS is the solution of the maximization problem:
max
A
f (A) ≡ (A− x)α (K −A− y)1−α , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, A ≥ x,K ≥ x+ y,
where K is the quantity of the resource to be divided (the first player receives A) and x
and y are the respective disagreement values. Note that for A = x or A = K−y, f = 0.
The parameter α reflects the relative priority (power) of the first player. When α = 0.5,
one obtains the symmetric NBS. Now:
∂f/∂A = (A− x)α−1 (K −A− y)−α [α (K − x− y ) − (A− x)]
so:
∂2f
/
∂A2 = (A− x) α−2 (K −A− y)−α−1
{
α (α− 1) (K −A− y)2
+ α2
(
(K − x− y) (A− x) − α (A− x)2
)
− α (A− x) (K −A− y)
}
the sign of which is that of (α− 1) (K −A− y)2 − α (A− x) which is negative since
0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Thus, the function is concave in A.
Now:
∂f/∂A = 0⇔ the only relevant solution is A∗ = α (K − y − x) + x
Note that A∗ linearly increases inα, which is intuitive, as α signifies the power of the
first player. It also linearly increases in x and linearly decreases in y. When a player
has a large “fallback” position, he will have to be “compensated” more.
A more-general scenario is where if one player gets A, the other gets g(A), where
g′ < 0 and g′′ < 0. Thus, although what is left for the second player is decreasing in
the first’s use, that impact is decreasing. So, the objective becomes:
max
A
h(A) ≡ (A− x)α [g (A)− y]1−α
Note that h (x) = h
(
g−1(y)
)
= 0; as with such allocation, both players will rather
stay at their disagreement point.
Now:
dh/∂A = (A− x)α−1 [g (A)− y]−α {α [g (A) − y] + (1− α)(A− x)g′(A)}
so:
∂2h
/
∂A2 = (α− 1) (A− x)α−2 [g (A)− y]−α−1
{
−αg′ (A) [α (g (A) − y)]
+ (1− α) (A− x) g′ (A) + (g (A) − y) [g′ (A) +Ag′′ (A)]
}
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Since 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the quantity in {} is positive, as (1− α2) g′ (A) [g (A)−y] is negative
and so is (1− α) g′ (A) (A− x).
Thus, h is concave in A.
The optimality condition is:
α[g (A∗) − y] + (1− α) (A∗ − x) g′ (A∗) = 0
The direction of the dependence of A∗ on α can be obtained by comparative statics:
dA∗/dα =
−g (A) + y + [A− x] g′ (A)
(1− α) (A− x) g′′ (A) + g′ (A)
As both numerator and denominator are negative, dA∗/dα ≥ 0.
That is, the more powerful the first player, the more he is allocated.
3. EXAMPLES
3.1. EXAMPLE 1
A2 +B2 = K ⇒ g (A) =
√
K −A2
g′(A) = −A
/√
K −A2 < 0
g
′′
(A) = K
/
K(K −A2) 32 ≤ 0⇒ concave
0 ≡ ∂
∂A
= α
[√
K −A2 − y
]
+ (1− α) (A− x) . −2A
2
√
K −A2
so the optimality condition is:
αK − αy
√
K −A∗2 + x(1− α)A∗ −A∗2 = 0
That leads to a quartic equation in A.
If x = y = 0, then A∗ =
√
αK.
If y = 0
A∗2 − x (1− α)A∗ − αK = 0
A∗ =
x (1− α) +
√
x2 (1− α)2 + 4αK
2
58 Y. Gerchak
3.2. EXAMPLE 2
This example has a convex function g.
AB = K
A,B ≥ 1⇒ g (A) = K/A⇒ g′ (A) = −K/A2 ⇒ g′′ (A) = 2K/A3 > 0
Thus:
α[K/A− y] + (1− α) (A− x) (−K/A2) = 0
⇒ A∗ = K (2α− 1) +
√
4α2K2 − 4αK2 +K2 + 4α(1− α)xyK
2αy
Easy to see that ∆ ≥ 0, and that A∗ ≥ 0.
dA∗
dα
has the sign of
2K
[
(2α− 1) (K − xy) +
√
4α2K2 − 4αK2 +K2 − 4α(1− α)xyK
]
Thus, if α < 3−
√
3
6 ≈ 0.2, the condition for dA
∗
dα > 0 is K ≥ xy(2α−1)2(6α2−6α+1) . If
α > 3−
√
3
6 ,
dA∗
dα < 0 always. Interestingly, here an increase in one’s power increases its
share only if his power was initially low.
4. NBS WITH N PLAYERS
Here, the function being maximized is:
g (A1,...,An−1) =
[
n−1∏
i=1
(Ai − xi)αi
] (
K −
n−1∑
i=1
Ai − xn
)αn
αi ≥ 0,
n∑
i=1
αi = 1.
This model was also discussed by Kalai (1977).
Now:
∂g
∂Ai
= αi (Ai − xi)αi−1
∏
j 6=i (Aj − xj)αj
(
K −∑n−1i=1 Ai − xn)αn
−
[∏n−1
i=1 (Ai − xi)αi
]
αn
(
K −∑n−1i=1 Ai − xn)αn−1
=
[∏n−1
j 6=i (Aj − xj)αj
]
(Ai − xi)αi−1
(
K −∑n−1i=1 Ai − xn)αn−1
×
{
αi (Ai − xi)αi−1
(
K −∑n−1i=1 Ai − xn)− αn} = 0
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As:
A
i
> xi ⇒
αi
(
K −∑n−1i=1 Ai − xn) (Ai − xi)αi−1 = αn .⇒
A∗i = xi + [
αn
αi
(K −∑n−1j=1 Aj − xn] 1αi−1 , i = 1, ....., n− 1
Note that, since 1
αi−1 < −1, A∗i decreases in the quantity in [ ]. Thus,A∗i ↑ xi, and,
A∗i ↓ K, Ai ↓
∑
Aj ,A∗i ↓ αn, A∗i ↑ αi.
The non-intuitive implication is that A∗i is decreasing in K. We cannot explain
this implication.
5. K-S SOLUTION
Let (d1 , d2) be the disagreement point and (M, N ) the ideal point, where each player
obtains his highest utility on S, where N ≥ d2, M ≥ d1. Then, the K-S solution is the
pair (u1, u2), where u1 + u2 = S, satisfying
u2 − d2
u1 − d1 =
N − d2
M − d1 , u1 ≥ d1, u2 ≥ d2
(though the utilities might be negative) (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975).
An asymmetric generalization could be (Dubra, 2001):
u2 − d2
u1 − d1 =
(N − d2)α
(M − d1)1−α
, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
It follows that:
u2 =
d2 (M − d1)1−α + (S − d1) (N − d2)α
(M − d1)1−α + (N − d2)α
while:
u1 = S − u2.
One can also show that:
u′2 (α) =
(u2 − d2) (M − d1)1−α log (M − d1) + (S − u2 − d1) (N − d2)α log (N − d2)
(M − d1)1−α + (N − d2)α
So, u′2 (α) > 0. This is intuitive.
Note that u1 = S − u2 is similar to the linear resource constraint A+B = K in
NBS. One could thus try the generalization suggested there (u1 = g (u2, S)), but we
shall not do so here.
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6. EXAMPLE
Suppose that u21 +u22 = S. Note that d2i ≤ S, i = 1, 2. The utilities may be negative.
So
√
S−u21−d2
u1−d1 =
(N−d2)α
(M−d1)1−α ≡ R [note that
dR
dα > 0]
⇒ (1 +R2)u21 − 2R (Rd1 − d2)u1 + d21R2 − S − 2d1d2R+ d22 = 0
u1 =
R (Rd1 − d2)±
√
S (1 +R2) − (Rd1 − d2)2
1 +R2
To have ∆ ≥ 0 , we require that:
S ≥ (Rd1 − d2)
2
1 +R2
We note that, if N ≥ (M − d1)−2 + d2, then R2 ≥ 1 , and it can be shown that then,
for the positive roots, du1/dR ≥ 0.
7. POSSIBLE RELEVANCE TO SUPPLY CHAIN ISSUES
Horizontal supply chains are created when several retailers (at the same echelon of
a supply chain that faces random demands) share inventories. This can be achieved
either by pooling inventories in a central location or by sharing inventories when one
retailer would have a shortage and the other an excess. Such pooling/sharing will
result in savings (e.g., Eppen, 1979); but, if the retailers are independent firms, the
question is how to divide the savings. This issue was explored using NBS by Hanany
and Gerchak (2008). If some retailers are more powerful than others, introducing
a-symmetry (NSNBS or NS K-S) would be natural.
Vertical decentralized supply chains [e.g., supplier(s)/manufacturer(s) and re-
tailer(s)] were explored extensively in operations-management literature (e.g., Cachon,
2003). There, after finding a type of contract that will coordinate the supply chain
(i.e., make it behave as an integrated chain), the issue that arises is how to divide
the profits. Mantin et al. (2014) propose an NSNBS manufacturer-retailer bargaining
model. Possibly, the NSK-S solution could also be employed, since each party’s ideal
point is obtaining all of the profit.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Symmetric NBS is a Non-Transferable Utility (NTU) concept; that is, at that
solution, all players’ situations improve vis-á-vis their disagreement points. No player
needs to compensate another for that to happen (as in TU), which is rather attractive.
This property is maintained by the NSNBS, and also holds for the NS K-S solution.
We provide some insight into the optimization of these non-symmetric functionals,
and extensive comparative statistics for them.
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